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NOTE
ADDRESSING DEFAULT TRENDS IN PATENT-BASED
SECTION 337 PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
John C. Evans*
Section 337 of the Tarif Act of 1930 empowers the United States In-
ternational Trade Commission to investigate imports to ensure
imports do not infringe on U.S. trademarks. The Commission per-
mits patent, copyright, and trademark owners to notify the
Commission of possibly infringing imports and to obtain exclusion
orders that prevent importation of products that infringe their intel-
lectual property. The total number of investigations increased from
1996 to 2005, yet the proportion of respondent defaults rose as
well. The increase in defaults suggests there is some systemic diffi-
culty in ensuring full participation. This Note argues that the res
judicata effects of particular outcomes in patent-based investiga-
tions may skew respondents'participation incentives. To recalibrate
respondent participation incentives and spread participation costs
more equitably, this Note proposes respondent class certification in
patent-based section 337 investigations as a procedural alternative
to intervention and mass joinder The proposed respondent class
certification would also require bifurcation be available because,
while many patent issues apply generally to each member of the
proposed respondent class, some issues require an individualized
determination for each respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last ten years, the United States International Trade Commis-
sion ("ITC") emerged as an important forum for patent litigation.' Section
337 of the Tariff Act of 19302 enables U.S. patentees with a domestic indus-
try to petition the ITC to investigate unfair trade practices, including
importation of infringing products.3 If the ITC finds that a challenged prod-
uct infringes on a patent, it may exclude the product from the United States
through U.S. Customs and Border Patrol ("Customs"). 4 Consequently, in a
global business environment, any business attempting to bring articles into
the United States is a potential respondent and faces the possibility that
those articles may be turned away at the border.
The ITC provides powerful remedies against infringing imports. Section
337 investigations proceed much faster than infringement trials in a federal
district court,5 placing significant pressure on respondents. A Customs ex-
clusion order affects respondents' products directly at the point of
importation, while an injunction's effects are more diffuse. Additionally, a
complainant in the ITC can seek investigations of large numbers of respon-
dents,6 which may be more efficient than piecemeal litigation against
individual defendants. Indeed, the number of section 337 investigations es-
sentially doubled between 1996 and 2005 and shows no signs of abating,
indicating that patentees have noticed the strategic benefits of section 337
investigations.7 But while investigations rose, the default rate doubled from
seven percent in the period from 1996 to 2000 to fourteen percent in the
8period from 2001 to 2005, imposing costs and inefficiencies.
I. The ITC is an administrative body rather than an Article III court. Although it is guided
by the same substantive patent law as federal district courts, and its decisions are reviewed by the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, ITC determinations are not binding on a subsequent fed-
eral district court because federal district courts have original jurisdiction for suits involving patents.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000); see also In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litig., 721 F.
Supp. 596, 601 (D. Del. 1989) ("Section 337 gives the ITC authority to determine patent validity
and enforceability questions only for the limited purpose of the administration of section 337.").
2. Tariff Act of 1930 § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000). See generally U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2004)
[hereinafter "FAQ"], available at http://www.usitc.gov/trade-remedy/int-prop/pub3708.pdf.
3. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(l)(B).
4. Id. § 1337(d), (g).
5. ITC investigations are generally initiated and completed within twelve to fifteen months.
See FAQ, supra note 2.
6. The jurisdictional reach of federal courts is often circumscribed by constitutional due
process concerns. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (requiring that de-
fendants not in the jurisdiction of the forum "have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))). ITC jurisdiction, however, is based on in
rem jurisdiction over products arriving at international ports of entry into the United States, mitigat-
ing potential due process limitations. See DONALD K. DUVALL ET AL., UNFAIR COMPETITION AND
THE ITC § 2:18 (2006) ("ITC jurisdiction in section 337 investigations is in rem and nationwide.").
7. See infra Section I.B. I.
8. See infra Section I.B.3.
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Currently available ITC procedural mechanisms may encourage strate-
gic default behavior. First, participation costs may be prohibitive. Appearing
may be more expensive than funneling imports through other entities,
forcing complainants to seek general exclusion orders. 9 Second, defaulting
respondents enjoy spillover benefits from invalidity and unenforceability
judgments won by appearing respondents: those judgments collaterally es-
top 0 the patentee from asserting infringement, at least in subsequent section
337 investigations." Similarly, respondents can appear and default later,
perhaps when it becomes apparent that other respondents will successfully
present defenses of invalidity or unenforceability. Appearing respondents
thus disproportionately shoulder the costs of obtaining judgments inherently
benefiting defaulting respondents.
This Note proposes respondent-initiated" respondent class certification
to address the growing rate of default in patent-based section 337 proceed-
ings, thereby providing a formal mechanism for cost sharing among
respondents that will make strategic default less attractive. Part I presents
empirical data concerning default patterns from 1996 to 2005, examines
respondents' disadvantages, and suggests respondent class certification may
reduce the disproportional costs for appearing respondents. Part II argues
that claim construction, defenses of invalidity and unenforceability, and do-
mestic industry analysis 3 may be conducted as class actions, but the acts of
unfair trade and infringement elements of a cause of action 4 require bifurca-
tion and separate proceedings. Part IH argues that respondent class
certification is consistent with the requirements of Rules 23(a) and 23(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This Note concludes that where a
9. The ITC can issue exclusion orders that reach the alternative business entities, but gen-
eral exclusion orders require either additional showings by the complainant and ITC proceedings to
establish either that limited exclusion orders are insufficient because respondents are likely to cir-
cumvent them or there is a pattern of unfair trade practices involving sources that are difficult to
identify, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2)(A), or, where all respondents default, that the violation of section
337 is supported by "substantial, reliable, and probative evidence" and the order is proper in light of
the statutory public interest factors and the factors set forth in section 337(d)(2) and section
210.50(c), id. § 1337(g)(2). Neither of these provisions is particularly efficient. The latter provision
is unavailable if even one respondent appears. The former provision requires additional time and
expense.
10. See infra Section II.A.
11. In these circumstances, defaulting respondents will still be subject to the procedural
disadvantages associated with default and face exclusion pending a final invalidity judgment.
12. While there may be certain advantages to complainant-initiated respondent class certifi-
cation, such as streamlining the process for obtaining a general exclusion order, complainant-
initiated respondent class certification is a topic beyond the scope of this Note.
13. Complainants must plead more than just infringement to state a claim of unfair trade
practices under section 337-there must also be a domestic industry for the patented subject matter.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3); see infra Section HA.
14. This Note follows the convention that application of the construed claims to the accused
product is called "infringement" despite the fact that the cause of action including claim construc-
tion and application of the construed claims to the accused product is also called "infringement"
See Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 E3d 985, 988 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (providing that
a device infringes a patent claim if it contains every limitation set forth in that claim, either literally
or by equivalence).
[Vol. 106:745
Addressing Default Trends in Section 337
respondent class meets the thresholds of Rule 23(a), it may be certified un-
der Rule 23(b)(3) for claim construction, defenses of invalidity and
unenforceability, and domestic industry analysis, but the acts of unfair trade
and infringement elements must be assessed individually.
I. SECTION 337 INVESTIGATION DEFAULT TRENDS DEMONSTRATE
DIFFICULTIES IN ENSURING RESPONDENT PARTICIPATION
This Part presents empirical data" concerning respondent default patterns
in section 337 investigations from 1996 to 2005.16 Section L.A briefly de-
scribes the ITC. Section I.B analyzes data derived from investigations from
1996 to 2005 for trends in default behavior. Finally, Section I.C suggests that
respondents encounter incentives encouraging strategic default and proposes
that these incentives could be addressed by respondent class certification.
A. The ITC is an Increasingly Important Alternative
Forum in Intellectual Property Disputes
In recent years, the ITC has become a popular forum. Between 1996 and
2000, the ITC initiated 63 investigations. 7 Between 2001 and 2005, the ITC
initiated 113 investigations." This represents about an eighty percent increase
in the number of investigations instituted.
Though it operates differently than an federal district court, the ITC is
effectively an alternative forum for patent infringement. Complainants'
pleadings are slightly different under section 337.'9 Much of the analysis
15. Three essential factors were considered for each investigation from this time period: the
number of respondents named, the number of defaults, and the number of places designated as the
origin of the accused goods. These data do not record the state or country of incorporation of de-
faulting respondents. Only in rare instances was this information available. This Note assumes,
however, that there is at least a rough correlation between the origin of the accused goods and the
state of incorporation of the defaulting respondent. Moreover, given the probability of outsourced
manufacturing activities, allegedly infringing behavior by agents of a corporation of another state
forms part of a joint enterprise. Thus the formal state of incorporation may be of little relevance to
the analysis.
16. This Part analyzes information culled from the Federal Register and the ITC website,
available at http://www.usitc.gov. The Electronic Data Information System (EDIS) available at
http://www.usitc.gov/secretary/edis.htm, was especially helpful.
17. Chronologically this period begins with Electronic Products, Including Semiconductor
Products, Manufactured by Certain Processes, Investigation No. 337-TA-381 (U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n Feb. 14, 1996), and ends with Closet Flange Rings, Investigation No. 337-TA-442, (U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n Dec. 21, 2000). Hyperlinks to information on each investigation are available at
http://info.usitc.gov/ouii/public/337inv.nsf/all?OpenView.
18. Chronologically this period begins with Flooring Products, Investigation No. 337-TA-
443 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Mar. 22, 2001), and ends with Devices for Determining Organ Posi-
tions and Certain Subassemblies Thereof, Investigation No. 337-TA-555 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Dec. 2, 2005). Hyperlinks to individual investigations are available at http://info.usitc.gov/ouii/
public/337inv.nsf/all?OpenView.
19. A complainant must establish (1) an act, such as importation of an infringing product
into the United States; (2) infringement of a patent; and (3) the existence of a domestic industry. See
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(I)(B), (a)(3) (2000).
February 20081
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centers on whether respondents' imported products infringe the complainant's
patent. In the infringement context, the ITC works like a federal district
court,20 but it employs different jurisdictional bases, different policy impera-
tives, and different remedies. First, the ITC's patent jurisdiction is limited to
deciding infringement for the purposes of unfair import trade practices under
section 337.2' By contrast, Article III courts have original jurisdiction over
12patent matters. ITC determinations are therefore not binding on federal
courts.23 Second, the ITC must, by statute, consider the public interest during
an investigation, and the ITC may only grant relief to patentees that have a
domestic industry harmed by the unfair importation of infringing products.25
Additionally, the Office of Unfair Import Investigations ("OUII") participates
in ITC investigations as a third party and protects the public interest.26 Finally,
ITC remedies are more limited-but also more targeted-than those available
through a federal court. The ITC cannot award money damages, but it can
issue three forms of injunctive remedy:27 limited exclusion orders, 8 general
29 3exclusion orders, and cease and desist orders.3 °
20. Section 337 investigations follow procedural rules similar but not identical to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. FAQ, supra note 2, at 2; see also U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure, 19 C.F.R. §§ 200-213 (2007). As for substantive law, the ITC follows precedent
from previous commission decisions and from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
21. In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litig., 721 F. Supp. 596, 601 (D. Del. 1989)
("Congress, in promulgating the jurisdictional parameters for the ITC and the federal District
Courts, created two separate jurisdictions to consider two distinct questions: jurisdiction over unfair
trade acts lies with the ITC while jurisdiction over the validity, enforceability and infringement of
patents lies with the federal District Courts.").
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000).
23. In re Convertible Rowing, 721 F. Supp. at 601.
24. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)-(g) (2000) (requiring consideration of the effects of remedial meas-
ures on public health and welfare and competitive conditions in the United States economy).
25. Id. § 1337(a)(2).
26. The ITC is required to examine the effect of any remedy issued "on the public health and
welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or directly
competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers." Id. § 1337 (c), (d)(l), (e)(l),
(f)(1), g(l). The OUII performs these investigative functions for the ITC, ensuring that these public
interest factors are always considered. FAQ, supra note 2.
27. 19 C.F.R. § 210.16(c) (2007).
28. Limited exclusion orders prohibit entry of infringing articles but are directed only at an
individual respondent. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1).
29. If the Commission finds limited exclusion orders insufficient because respondents are
likely to circumvent them or because there is a pattern of unfair trade practices involving sources
that are difficult to identify, it has authority to issue general exclusion orders. Id. § 1337(d)(2)(A),
(B). In situations involving defaulting respondents, the Commission may issue a general exclusion
order in a default circumstance under section 33 7 (g)( 2 ) provided that the violation of section 337 is
supported by "substantial, reliable, and probative evidence" and the order is proper in light of the
statutory public interest factors and the factors set forth in section 1337(d)(2). Id. § 1337(g)(2).
30. Id. § 1337(0.
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B. Analysis of Section 337 Investigations from 1996 to 2005
This Section presents empirical data regarding section 337 investigations
from 1996 to 2005. Section I.B. I demonstrates that section 337 investigations
grew larger on average and that large investigations (consisting of ten or more
respondents) became more common. Section I.B.2 shows that complainants
increasingly designated three or more origins of accused products, suggesting
that respondents are similarly geographically dispersed. Finally, Section I.B.3
indicates that the overall proportion of default increased significantly from
1996 to 2005.
1. Complainants Named Larger Numbers of Respondents
Section 337 proceedings increasingly involve large numbers of respon-
dents, and the number and frequency of investigations involving ten or more
respondents are rising. Complainants in section 337 investigations can and do
name multiple respondents in a single action. Respondents more than doubled
in the period between 2001 and 2005 (661) compared to the period between
1996 and 2000 (245). Each investigation implicated an average of almost four
respondents between 1996 and 2000 compared to an average of almost six
respondents between 2001 and 2005. Large investigations increased: investi-
gations with ten or more respondents almost quadrupled (eighteen between
2001 and 2005 compared to five between 1996 and 2000), and investigations
with twenty or more respondents quadrupled (four between 2001 and 2005




Total number of respondents 245 661
Average respondents per investigation 3.89 5.85
Ten or more respondents 5 18
Twenty or more respondents 1 4
An overview of respondent involvement comparing the period between 1996 and 2000 with the period
between 2001 and 2005. Information regarding respondent numbers was collected from the Federal
31Register and from the ITC website.
2. Complainants Designated Greater Numbers
of Origins of Accused Products
Complainants increasingly identified a greater geographic distribution in
the origins of accused products, implying more geographically dispersed
respondents. The number of investigations designating four or more origins
31. See sources cited supra note 16.
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of accused products rose from only one between 1996 and 200032 to twelve
between 2001 and 2005. 33 Similarly, complainants designated three or more
origins of accused products in five investigations between 1996 and 2000
and twenty investigations between 2001 and 2005.
34
3. Respondents' Overall Proportion of Default
Increased from 1996 to 2005
Default is a serious problem in section 337 investigations, and data from
recent years indicate that default increased significantly.35 Between 1996 and
2000, respondents averaged a default rate of about seven percent. Between
2001 and 2005, however, default increased steadily and dramatically. The
lowest default rate in that timeframe occurred in 2001-three percent. That
rate tripled to nine percent in 2002 and nearly tripled again to twenty-two
32. Organic Photoconductor Drums and Products Containing the Same, Investigation No.
337-TA-411 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n June 4, 1998), available at http://info.usitc.gov/ouii/public/
337inv.nsf/all?OpenView (follow "Investigation No. 411" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
33. See Laminated Floor Panels, Investigation No. 337-TA-545 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Aug. 3, 2005); Tadalafil or Any Salt or Solvate Thereof, Investigation No. 337-TA-539 (U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n May 13, 2005); Foam Masking Tape, Investigation No. 337-TA-528 (U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Jan. 4, 2005); Point of Sale Terminals and Components Thereof, Investigation No.
337-TA-524 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Sept. 3, 2004); Ink Markers and Packaging Thereof, Investi-
gation No. 337-TA-522 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Aug. 24, 2004); Optical Disk Controller Chips
and Chipsets and Products, Investigation No. 337-TA-506 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Apr. 14, 2004);
Zero-Mercury-Added Alkaline Batteries, Parts Thereof, and Products Containing Same, Investiga-
tion No. 337-TA-493 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Jun. 2, 2003); Plastic Grocery and Retail Bags,
Investigation No. 337-TA-492 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n May 8, 2003); Sildenafil or Any Pharma-
ceutically Acceptable Salt Thereof, Investigation No. 337-TA-489 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Mar. 6,
2003); Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof, Investigation No. 337-TA-487 (U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Feb. 13, 2003); Compact Disc and DVD Holders, Investigation No. 337-TA-482
(U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Oct. 22, 2002); Power Saving Integrated Circuits and Products Contain-
ing Same, Investigation No. 337-TA-463 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Aug. 23, 2001). These
investigations are all available at http://info.usitc.gov/oui'lpublic/337inv.nsf/all?OpenView (follow
pertinent "Investigation No." hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 26, 2007).
34. This trend may impose logistical difficulties for respondents to form collective defense
arrangements such as different time zones, language and cultural barriers. See, e.g., Press Release,
U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, ITC Institutes Section 337 Investigation on Certain Sildenafil or Any
Pharmaceutically Acceptable Salt Thereof, Such as Sidenafil Citrate, and Products Containing Same
(Mar. 3, 2003), http://edisweb.usitc.gov/edismirror/337-489NViolation/178441/178523/c1/28549.pdf
(designating Belize, China, India, Israel, Nicaragua, Syria, and the United Kingdom as origins of
accused products).
35. From 1996 to 2000, the data were relatively noisy due to the small number of investiga-
tions instituted during that time period. Approximately thirteen investigations were instituted per
year from 1996 to 2000. For example, only eleven investigations were instituted in 1998-from
Lens-Fitted Film Packages, Investigation No. 337-TA-406 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Mar. 25, 1998)
to Compact Multipurpose Tools, Investigation No. 337-TA-416 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Sept. 30,
1998). Hyperlinks to individual investigations numbers are available at http://info.usitc.gov/
ouiilpublic/337inv.nsf/all?OpenView. One of those investigations-Lens-Fitted Film Packages,
Investigation No. 337-TA-406 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n March 25, 1998), available at
http://info.usitc.gov/ouii/public/337inv.nsf/all?OpenView (follow "Investigation No. 406" hyperlink)
(last visited Sept. 12, 2007)-was atypical. The complaint named twenty-six respondents, nine of
whom were found in default. That investigation was easily the largest in the period between 1996
and 2000, and it had a significant effect on the overall rate of default for 1998. The other years were
more consistent with a lower rate of default.
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percent in 2003. The rate dropped off slightly in 2004, falling to fifteen
percent. In 2005, however, the rate jumped to twenty-three percent. Overall,
respondents averaged a default rate of about fourteen percent between 2001
and 2005. On average, at least fourteen percent and perhaps more than





I ~t-I'Found in Default
10%,70%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Percentages of respondents defaulting in relation to the total number of named respondents in every investi-
gation. Error bars indicate each data point's deviation from the three-year average. Information regarding
respondent numbers was collected from the Federal Register and from the ITC website.3
C. High Default Rates and Practical Considerations
Indicate Non-Optimal Incentives
This Section argues that respondents' inherent procedural disadvantages
combine with the opportunity for defaulting respondents to free ride on ap-
pearing respondents to create misaligned participation incentives. These
incentives could be recalibrated by consolidating all respondents into a co-
hesive class based on common interests. Default permits respondents to
avoid appearance expenses at the cost of suffering interim default penalties.
Yet if an appearing respondent achieves a judgment endorsing a defense of
invalidity or unenforceability, those default penalties disappear on collateral
estoppel grounds. Appearing respondents thus serve as reluctant champions
for respondents as a whole. This Section concludes that respondent class
certification provides a formal procedural mechanism for cost sharing
36. Indeed, from 2001 to 2005 there were twelve investigations where twenty percent or
more respondents defaulted, compared to only four such investigations from 1996 to 2000.
37. See sources cited supra note 16.
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among respondents that permits -appearing respondents to lower their costs
and would-be defaulting respondents to avoid interim default penalties.
Responding to an ITC investigation can be more challenging than de-
fending a patent infringement claim in federal court.38 Complainants have
significant momentum even before the ITC publishes notices of investiga-
39tion. For example, ITC filings require extensive, detailed pleadings, so
complainants start with a strong understanding of the patent. They usually
request ITC staff attorneys to review their complaints prior to filing. Also,
ITC complainants often draft discovery in advance so that requests may be
served immediately on respondents.
Respondents, by contrast, are at a tactical disadvantage in terms
of momentum and timing. The ITC gives respondents only twenty days
to respond to a complaint. 0 If respondents do not respond, default is
likely.4 Second, an administrative law judge ("AU") generally allows only
ten days for response to a discovery request. 42 Respondents have little time
to develop their defenses, especially where formal institution of the investi-
gation is their first notice of the proceedings. Even though many
respondents learn of complaints before investigations are instituted,43 these
circumstances still present crushing deadlines.4 Because ITC investigations
generally begin and end within twelve to fifteen months, respondents cannot
make up this disadvantage at a later point.
Facing a costly, intense, and distracting struggle in a foreign court-and
starting with substantial disadvantages-respondents might rationally de-
cide to default. 45 First, participation costs could be prohibitive. If they are,
38. See ALICE ALEXANDRA KIPEL, HOW TO START FROM BEHIND AND FINISH AHEAD: SEC-
TION 337 FROM A RESPONDENT'S PERSPECTIVE (2005), http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/
2516.pdf.
39. For example, complaints must include a claim chart. 19 C.FR. § 210.12(a)(9)(vii)
(2007). Kipel notes that complaints must be pled with sufficient factual bases for a summary deter-
mination in the complainant's favor in case of respondent default. KIPEL, supra note 38, at 12-3
(citing 19 C.F.R. § 210.16(c)).
40. 19 C.ER. § 210.13(a).
41. Id. § 210.16(a)(1) ("A party shall be found in default if it fails to respond to the com-
plaint and notice of investigation in the manner prescribed in § 210.13 or § 210.59(c) .... ").
42. Kipel notes that the AU has authority to establish the timing for discovery requests and
responses. KIPEL, supra note 38, at 12-3 n.6. She further notes that "[a] ten-day response time is
typical." Id.
43. Id. at 12-4.
44. See id. at 12-4 to 12-7, 12-9 to 12-12.
45. Respondents failing to appear or participate in ITC investigations will most likely be
subject to procedural penalties. If a respondent fails to respond to a complaint and notice of investi-
gation, another party-including other respondents---can seek an order that respondent show cause
or be found in default. 19 C.F.R. § 210.16(b)(1). If the respondent cannot or does not show cause,
the AU must issue an initial determination ("ID") finding that respondent in default. Id.
§ 210.16(a)(1). The AU can also issue such a show cause order on his or her own initiative. By
defaulting, the respondent waives its right to appear, its right to be served with documents, and its
right to contest allegations made in the investigation. Id. § 210.16(b)(3). After the Commission finds
a respondent in default, the complainant can seek relief immediately. Id. § 210.16(c)(1). Addition-
ally, facts alleged against a defaulting respondent are presumed true.
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respondents could either fold, stop importing into the United States, or con-
46
tinue importing into the United States through extralegal means. Second, if
any respondent wins on invalidity or unenforceability, so does a defaulter:
those judgments collaterally estop the patentee from asserting infringement
in subsequent ITC proceedings.4 ' Finally, respondents could split the differ-
ence, participating until the outcome becomes predictable and then
defaulting, leaving other respondents to bear remaining expenses.
Steep costs of litigation and the possibility of free riding on other re-
spondents' efforts present collective action problems like those in a federal
class action. Typically, class actions involve a group of plaintiffs asserting a
claim against a defendant or defendants. s Class actions overcome insuffi-
cient incentives for single plaintiffs to sue a defendant by consolidating a
group of plaintiffs sharing a common claim.49
Defendant class actions are also possible in federal court. 50 The collec-
tive action problem defendant classes face is the converse of the problem
faced by plaintiffs: no single defendant has sufficient incentive to present a
defense, but a consolidated group of defendants has sufficient incentive to
present a common defense. Where a group of defendants face this collective
action problem, "the defendant[s] may incur reduced costs if certification
prompts class members to help fund a common defense."'" Thus, by pooling
their resources, a diverse group of defendants facing similar claims from a
plaintiff can lower their participation costs. Moreover, if members of a de-
fendant class contribute to "fund a common defense," the costs of obtaining
a judgment with collateral estoppel effects are more equally spread. Finally,
class certification moots the issue of later default by consolidating all re-
spondents into a class for disposition of common issues.
Respondent classes are plausible in patent-based section 337 investiga-
tions52 for many of the same reasons. Appearing respondents will be
46. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Of course, if a defaulter did not rechannel its
products through another entity, the defaulter would still be subject to a temporary exclusion order
pending the outcome of the investigation and exhaustion of appeals.
47. See infra Section H.A.
48. E.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
49. Id. at 617 (remarking that the class action form "'aggregat[es] the relatively paltry poten-
tial recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor'" (quoting Mace v. Van
Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))).
50. See generally Donald E. Burton, The Metes and Bounds of the Defendant Class Action in
Patent Cases, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 292 (2006) (citing numerous federal court
decisions involving defendant class actions); Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 630
(1978) (citing numerous federal court decisions involving defendant class actions).
51. Tilley v. TJX Cos., 345 F.3d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 2003).
52. Class certification in section 337 investigations may be a novel approach. The ITC Rules
of Practice and Procedure are silent on class certification. As an initial matter, congressional action
may be required to enable class certification in the ITC. On a more practical level, such action may
be warranted. Complainants are increasingly structuring their claims in patent-based section 337
investigations in a manner similar to a patent class action in a federal district court: one complainant
will often name many accused infringers in a single action. See, e.g., Notice to the Parties, Certain
Laminated Floor Panels, Investigation No. 337-TA-545 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Oct.
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motivated to move for respondent class certification to lower their costs.
Defaulting respondents will be motivated to contribute to the common de-
fense in order to avoid default penalties. Moreover, once respondents
coalesce into a cohesive class, opportunities for strategic default become
irrelevant.
Defendant class actions are rare, but they have arisen in patent cases.53 In
such cases, patentees asserted infringement against groups of defendants.
Where those groups met the conditions of Rules 23(a) and 23(b), courts cer-
tified the defendant classes.54 But patent class actions are exceedingly
uncommon.55 First, plaintiffs need not name a class of accused infringers
because the risk of an injunction usually brings defendants into court.56 Sec-
ond, defendants may take conflicting legal or factual positions, making
consolidation less attractive.57 Also, the patent venue statute restricts venue
choice in district court infringement actions, limiting courts' jurisdictional
reach. 5 Finally, defendant-initiated classes are uncommon because convinc-
ing competitors to join a common cause is challenging.
These arguments apply with different force in patent-based section 337
investigations. First, the risk of exclusion orders is not adequate incentive
for respondents to answer. While respondents may take inconsistent posi-
tions of law or fact, many issues are common to all respondents and
independent of any individual respondent's circumstance. 59 The patent venue
statute does not determine the ITC's jurisdiction.60 Respondents cannot con-
trol where or when they face potential liability: they are trapped together in
the same forum against a common adversary. Collateral estoppel and stare
decisis are more pronounced in the ITC because the ITC operates as a single
forum.6' Judgments in patent-based section 337 investigations necessarily
affect the interests of both appearing and defaulting respondents alike. Con-
sequently, collective defense arrangements make more sense in section 337
investigations than in federal district court.
The ITC Rules of Practice and Procedure do not provide a formal proce-
62dural mechanism for class certification, so respondents do not have a
13, 2005), http://edisweb.usitc.gov/edismirror/337-545NViolation/240373/268096/12ef/6beO97.pdf
(naming thirty respondents).
53. Note, supra note 50, at 632. This topic is developed further infra Part I.
54. See infra Part III.
55. 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 21.03[71 (1978).
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2000) ("Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in
the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of in-
fringement and has a regular and established place of business.").
59. See infra Section ll.A.
60. See DUVALL ET AL., supra note 6.
61. See infra Section [l.B.2.
62. Joinder and intervention, the current procedural forms utilized in the ITC, do not address
incentive-balancing concerns as efficiently as class certification for at least two reasons: even if
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formal procedural means for casting their lots together. The ITC does have
authority to issue what are effectively class remedies-exclusion orders ap-
plicable to a class of articles regardless of source. 63 The ITC permits joinder
and third party intervention, allowing absent parties to protect their interests,
yet these procedural mechanisms impose the same burdens and disadvan-
tages as appearing as a respondent64 and do not present the same set of
incentives as class certification. Though ALJs have broad discretion to set
ground rules for section 337 investigations, class certification is a significant
change to current procedural rules. Congressional action may be necessary
to implement this incentive-balancing mechanism.
II. CLASS ACTIONS ARE HARMONIOUS WITH PATENT LAW
AND SECTION 337 LAW
Patent-infringement analysis generally involves three major aspects:
claim construction, application of the construed claims to the accused prod-
uct (infringement), and invalidity and unenforceability defenses. As a
threshold matter, a court construes the claims to determine their scope and
content. 65 The court then reads the construed claims onto the accused product
to determine whether it infringes the patent.66 If each element of the claim is
present either literally or equivalently in the accused product, the accused
67
product infringes. The accused infringer may present invalidity defenses to
which the claim construction applies as well.6s Unenforceability defenses do
not depend on claim construction and thus may be presented at any time. 69 In
the context of unfair trade, section 337 adds additional elements: acts of unfair
joined or intervening, each party must still provide its own claim or defense (or make mutual
agreements), and the incentive to join or intervene is minimal because absent parties can always
enjoy the benefits of collateral estoppel. See Int'l Trade Comm'n Procedures Rule, 19 C.F.R.
§ 210.19 (2007) (procedure for intervention).
63. See, e.g., Tadalafil or Any Salt or Solvate Thereof, and Products Containing Same, Inves-
tigation No. 337-TA-539 (Int'l Trade Comm'n May 13, 2005), available at http://info.usitc.gov/
ouii/public/337inv.nsf/all?OpenView (follow "Investigation No. 539" hyperlink) (last visited Sept.
12, 2007) (issuing a general exclusion order where all named respondents defaulted); see also 19
U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2) (2000) (permitting general exclusion orders where limited exclusion orders are
inadequate due to likelihood of circumvention or a pattern of unfair trade practices combined with
difficulty in identifying source);'id. § 1337(g)(2) (permitting general exclusion orders in situations
where all respondents default).
64. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
65. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); see also id. at 990 (Mayer, J., concurring) ("Anyone who wants to know
what a patent protects must first read its claims, for they are the measure of its scope." (citing Aro
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961))).
66. See, e.g., N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
67. See, e.g., Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
68. See, e.g., N. Am. Vaccine, Inc., 7 F.3d at 1579 ("Whether a claim is invalid for indefinite-
ness depends on whether those skilled in the art would understand the scope of the claim when the
claim is read in light of the specification." (citing Orthodontics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc.,
806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986))).
69. Gardco Mfg. Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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trade and domestic industry.7° That is, a complainant must show each re-
spondent performed an act of unfair trade and that the complainant has a
domestic industry to protect.
This Part demonstrates that claim construction, defenses of invalidity
and unenforceability, and domestic industry analysis are appropriate for
class adjudication, 7' even though the acts of unfair trade and infringement
elements of a claim must be evaluated on an individual basis." Section II.A
shows that claim construction is efficiently resolved in class form because it
is predominantly a matter of law73 and that defenses of validity and unen-
forceability and domestic industry analysis raise questions of law and fact
independent of individual respondents' circumstances, allowing efficient
resolution in the class form. Section II.B reasons that the acts of unfair im-
port trade and infringement elements of a claim necessarily depend on
individual conduct and products, precluding efficient resolution in the class
form. However, Section II.C argues that the ITC could certify a class limited
to common issues and determine other issues individually.
A. Class Actions Accommodate Questions of Law or
Fact Common to All Respondents
Many patent issues of law and fact depend only on patentees, their con-
duct, or independent facts, and not on who accused infringers are, what they
did, or the features of accused products. Accordingly, this Section argues
that claim construction, certain defenses of invalidity and unenforceability,
and domestic industry analysis lend themselves to resolution in the class
form.
1. Claim Construction can be Conducted for a Respondent Class
While each accused infringer may wish to construe the claims in a man-
ner that excludes its particular product, both the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have held that claim construction is a
question of law74 that can be efficiently resolved in the class form. Claim
construction determines the meaning of the inventor's claims. 75 Courts con-
strue claims primarily in light of the patent's "intrinsic record": claim
language, information in the specification, and the prosecution history be-
70. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2000); see infra Sections HA & l.B.
71. For a discussion of patent class actions in federal district courts, see Burton, supra note
50, at 17.
72. See infra Section II.C (discussing FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A), 42).
73. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F3d 967, 976-77 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
74. Id.
75. See Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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fore the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO").76 Extrinsic
evidence is all evidence not found in the record 77 and is of limited utility
relative to the intrinsic record. 8
Though accused infringers may argue different claim constructions, their
arguments must necessarily share common factual elements. Accused in-
fringers differ only in the details of their accused products, 9 which should
not be consulted extensively during claim construction.'s Still, the Federal
Circuit has held that it may be inefficient to construe the claims without ref-
erence to the accused product." In other words, an accused infringer's
product provides "meaningful context" for a court's claim construction
analysis .
76. See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568 (1876); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
77. Tanabe Seiyaku Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 109 F3d 726, 732 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
("[Eixtrinsic evidence ... is[] evidence outside the record before the PTO .... ); see also Phillips,
415 F.3d at 1317 ("[Elxtrinsic evidence . .. 'consists of all evidence external to the patent and
prosecution history .... ' (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 980)).
78. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319. The court notes as follows:
[E]xtrinsic evidence may be useful to the court, but it is unlikely to result in a reliable interpre-
tation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence.
Nonetheless, because extrinsic evidence can help educate the court regarding the field of the
invention and can help the court determine what a person of ordinary skill in the art would un-
derstand claim terms to mean, it is permissible for the district court in its sound discretion to
admit and use such evidence.
Id.
79. See Young Engineers, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 721 F.2d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
1983) ("[T]he status of an infringer is derived from the status imposed on the thing that is embraced
by the asserted patent claims, the thing adjudged to be infringing.").
80. For a discussion of claim construction, see SRI International v. Matsushita Electric
Corp. of America, 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Markey, C.J.):
A claim is construed in the light of the claim language, the other claims, the prior art, the
prosecution history, and the specification, not in light of the accused device. ... [Cilaims are
not construed "to cover" or "not to cover" the accused device. That procedure would make in-
fringement a matter of judicial whim. It is only after the claims have been construed without
reference to the accused device that the claims, as so construed, are applied to the accused de-
vice to determine infringement.
Id. at 1118; see also NeoMagic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems, Inc., 287 F.3d 1062, 1074 (Fed. Cir.
2002) ("It is well settled that claims may not be construed by reference to the accused device." (cit-
ing SRI Int'l, 775 F.2d at 1118)).
81. Pall Corp. v. Hemasure Inc., 181 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Although the con-
struction of the claim is independent of the device charged with infringement, it is convenient for the
court to concentrate on those aspects of the claim whose relation to the accused device is in dis-
pute. '); Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("Of course the particular accused product (or process) is kept in mind, for it is efficient to focus on
the construction of only the disputed elements or limitations of the claims.")
82. For a discussion of the role of the product in claim construction analysis, see Wilson
Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2006):
[T]he legal function of giving meaning to claim terms always takes place in the context of a
specific accused infringing device or process. While a trial court should certainly not prejudge
the ultimate infringement analysis by construing claims with an aim to include or exclude an
accused product or process, knowledge of that product or process provides meaningful context




While the accused infringer's product is clearly relevant, its relevance is
necessarily abstract and subordinate to intrinsic evidence. Courts use extrin-
sic evidence for limited purposes in claim construction, including
"educat[ing] the court regarding the field of the invention 83 and "help[ing]
the court determine what a person of ordinary skill in the art would under-
stand claim terms to mean.' '84 Yet an accused product is not strictly needed to
teach the court or even necessary to decipher technical language. Even more
significantly, evidence relating to the accused product may bias the court's
construction toward or away from the accused product.
85
In claim construction, then, individualized issues of fact are subordinate
to common and predominant issues of law, making class certification on the
issue of claim construction at least plausible.86 Because they provide only
"meaningful context," accused products are unlikely to differ enough to af-
fect claim construction meaningfully. If they do, a court is impermissibly
conflating claim construction and infringement analysis. Thus, common
questions of law probably make accused infringers cohesive enough for
class certification on the issue. 7
2. Validity Accords Strongly with Respondent Class Disposition
The argument for class certification is strongest in the validity context
because validity is independent from any individual accused infringer's cir-
cumstance. Accused infringers commonly assert validity defenses based on
statutory patent requirements of utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and written
description . 8 These defenses relate only to the patent and the patentee's
conduct.89 Thus, at first glance, validity could be efficiently resolved in a
83. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319.
84. Id.
85. Pall, 181 F.3d at 1309-10 (overturning district court's claim construction, "construed ...
with an eye to the accused ... system," as too broad because it was substantially based on features
of the accused article and conflicted with limitations in the patent specification).
86. Donald E. Burton discusses claim construction as a plausible basis for class certification:
One option to meet that requirement of the rule is for the court ... to limit the issues on which
the class is certified to validity and claim construction issues on the ground that, in contrast to
the proof on those issues, the proof regarding whether particular accused products infringe and
regarding calculation of damages will diverge too significantly from defendant to defendant to
enable all of those issues to be tried in one proceeding.
Burton, supra note 50, at 307-08 (footnote omitted).
87. The Supreme Court finds that classes are properly certified where they "are sufficiently
cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
594 (1997). Cohesiveness often depends on the trial's fundamental focus on common questions of
law and fact. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
88. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2000).
89. See, e.g., id. § 101 ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."); id. § 102 ("A person shall
be entitled to a patent unless .... ); id. § 103 ("A patent may not be obtained... if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as
a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made .... ").
[Vol. 106:745
Addressing Default Trends in Section 337
class action because no principled difference exists between one accused
infringer and any other.
Despite its status as a common question of law and fact, class actions on
validity in -federal district courts are rare, in large part because of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University
of Illinois Foundation.90 Blonder-Tongue held that any accused infringer
may assert collateral estoppel against a patentee whose patent has been
found invalid in a third-party proceeding if the patentee had a full and fair
opportunity to present its case. In other words, once a patent is invalid, it is
invalid in rem.9' A validity judgment only binds litigants and does not pre-• 93
clude validity challenges by third parties. Each subsequent accused
infringer can challenge its validity, placing the patent at risk in each succes-
sive action.94 Patentees must win on validity every time; accused infringers
need only win once.
In a federal district court, there is little incentive for accused infringers
to band together as a class or for patentees to name a class of accused in-
fringers on the issue of validity. Because Blonder-Tongue encourages
multiple validity challenges, accused infringers gain nothing by certifying or
joining a class. If the class loses, the accused infringer is bound by the valid-
ity judgment. Even if the class wins, the accused infringer benefits no more
than if it had chosen not to be part of the class. On the other side, patentees
certifying classes of accused infringers risk facing all potential invalidity
challenges at once, magnifying the risk of invalidity.
In patent-based section 337 investigations, however, these incentives in-
vert. Complainants readily name large numbers of respondents (despite the
multiplied risk), increasing the chance that at least one respondent will ap-95
pear. If at least one respondent appears, defaulting respondents can rely on
that respondent as a "champion" because Blonder-Tongue ensures spillover
benefits of invalidity or unenforceability judgments. Moreover, because sec-
tion 337 investigations proceed so quickly, defaulting respondents do not
have long to wait.
90. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
91. Id. at 350.
92. See id. at 339-46; cf Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 667 (1969) ("It is generally the rule
that licensees may avoid further royalty payments, regardless of the provisions of their contract,
once a third party proves that the patent is invalid.").
93. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 349-50.
94. See Note, supra note 50, at 632 n.10 ("Blonder-Tongue ... [indicates that] the plaintiff's
loss is generalized while his victory cannot be.").
95. Because respondents are subject to nationwide in rem jurisdiction, see supra note 6,
chances of at least one respondent appearing are reasonable.
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3. Certain Unenforceability Defenses Suit the Class Form
Like invalidity defenses, some unenforceability defenses focus only on
the patentee's conduct 96 and therefore present subject matter that may be
efficiently resolved in a class action. Courts can render patents unenforce-
able (even if still valid) through a variety of unenforceability defenses,
including patent misuse and inequitable conduct. Under the doctrine of pat-
ent misuse, a patentee's anticompetitive use of a patent can make a patent
unenforceable until the patentee purges.97 A court will find patent misuse
when an alleged infringer can demonstrate that the "patentee has impermis-
sibly broadened the 'physical or temporal scope' of the patent grant with
anticompetitive effect."9' An accused infringer need not suffer individual
harm to invoke the defense.99 Accordingly, because the necessary facts are
independent of accused infringers' circumstances, patent misuse presents
common questions of law and fact conforming to class certification.
Courts have equitable discretion not to enforce the patent if a patentee
engaged in inequitable conduct before the PTO in procuring a patent. To
show inequitable conduct, an accused infringer must establish three ele-
ments'°°: a culpable act, ' materiality,' °2 and intent.'O° Once the accused
infringer establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the patentee to
96. Other equitable defenses that arise in patent infringement actions, such as prosecution or
litigation laches and equitable estoppel, involve interactions between the patentee and individual
defendants and accordingly do not accord with the class form. See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L.
Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that both laches and equita-
ble estoppel precluded patentee's claim).
97. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492-93 (1942).
98. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omit-
ted).
99. 6 CHISUM, supra note 55, § 19.04 ("If such misuse is found, the courts will withhold any
remedy for infringement ... -even against an infringer who is not harmed by the abusive prac-
tice.").
100. Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm. Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
101. Culpable acts include misrepresentations, misleading statements, and omissions of mate-
rial fact. The subject matter in question must also be material. See Bd. of Educ. v. Am. Bioscience,
Inc., 333 F.3d 1330, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
102. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
("[I]nformation is material when there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would
consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue."); see also Bruno Indep.
Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 E3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The current
version of Rule 56 provides that subject matter not disclosed to the PTO is material where it is "not
cumulative to information already of record" and either establishes or helps to establish a prima
facie case of unpatentability of a claim or refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant
takes in opposing an unpatentability argument or asserting a patentability argument. 37 C.ER.
§ 1.56(b) (2006).
103. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 438 E3d 1123, 1133-35 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("'[A]
patentee facing a high level of materiality and clear proof that it knew or should have known of that
materiality, can expect to find it difficult to establish "subjective good faith" sufficient to prevent the
drawing of an inference of intent to mislead."' (quoting Critikron, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular
Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1997))).
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present credible reasons for the failure to disclose material information.'°4
Courts balance materiality of misrepresentation or omission against intent to
determine whether equity demands the patent be rendered unenforceable.' °5
Common respondent-independent facts support class certification for
these unenforceability defenses. These defenses arise only from the pat-
entee's conduct, independent of any accused infringer. Moreover, collateral
estoppel effects of an unenforceability judgment are equivalent to those of
an invalidity judgment,' °6 creating a climate that similarly encourages the
multiplication of trials in federal district courts.1
0 7
4. Domestic Industry Accommodates Respondent Class Disposition
Section 337's requirement of domestic industry constitutes an additional
common question of fact that could be efficiently resolved in the class
form.0 8 The domestic industry requirement stems from section 337's status
as part of the Tariff Act of 1930: while patent ownership suffices for stand-
ing in federal district courts, only complainants with domestic industries to
protect are entitled to remedies from the ITC. Complainants usually satisfy
the domestic industry requirement by demonstrating that they have invested
in domestic production or domestic licensing activities. °
Domestic industry requires a two-pronged test: a technical prong and an
economic prong. The technical prong concerns whether the complainant's
domestic industry implicates the subject matter claimed by the asserted pat-
ent."1 0 Essentially, the ITC reads the construed claims onto the complainant's
product, and if the complainant's product does not embody each and every
limitation of at least one claim of the patent, the complainant does not sat-
isfy the technical prong.'I1
The economic prong analyzes the complainant's level of activity or in-
vestment in exploiting the patent in the United States."' The activity or
investment is "determined on a case-by-case basis in light of the realities of
the marketplace and encompasses not only the manufacturing operations but
may include, in addition, distribution, research and development, and
104. See Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs. Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1189 (Fed. Cir.
1993); see also Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
105. Critikon, Inc., 120 F.3d at 1256; see also eSpeed, Inc. v. Brokertec USA, L.L.C., 480
F.3d 1129, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
106. Gen. Electro Music Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405, 1413 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
("The principle of Blonder-Tongue... respecting collateral estoppel also applies to unenforceability.").
107. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
108. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2) (2000).
109. Id. § 1337(a)(3)(A)-(C).
110. Alloc, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Ill. See id. (citing Coming Glass Works v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1559, 1563
(Fed. Cir. 1986)).
112. See, e.g., Final Initial and Recommended Determinations, Certain Auto. Parts, Investiga-




sales."' 3 The threshold for finding sufficient activity is fairly low." 4 For ex-
ample, research and development, sales, and the incurring of administrative
expenses in the United States can support the economic prong."5 If a com-
plainant fails to establish a nexus between the domestic industry and the
patent, it cannot prevail in a section 337 investigation."
6
Respondents can challenge either the technical prong or the economic
prong of complainants' claims of domestic industry."7 Any argument will be
based on the complainant's products (technical prong) or conduct (economic
prong). Like invalidity and unenforceability defenses, nothing in law or fact
distinguishes respondents from each other. Accordingly, domestic industry
could be resolved efficiently in the class form.
B. Class Actions Are Not Appropriate for Individualized Issues
Other relevant issues of law and fact require direct reference to accused
infringers' conduct or their accused products. Accordingly, this Section ar-
gues that the elements of acts of unfair trade and infringement-in the sense
of applying the construed claims to an accused product-do not lend them-
selves to resolution in the class form.
Individual acts of unfair trade cannot be analyzed in a certified respon-
dent class because such analysis requires direct reference to each
respondent's conduct.' 8 Respondents rarely deny such acts.' Commonly,
113. Initial Determination, Certain Microlithographic Machines and Components Thereof,
Investigation No. 337-TA-468, at 341 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Jan. 29, 2003), http://edisweb.usitc.
gov/edismirror/337-468/Violationl1 80059/199617/bbf/4f9ed7.pdf.
114. Transcript of Hearing at 108, 11. 20-21, Certain Ink Cartridges and Components Thereof,
Investigation No. 337-TA-565 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n May 2, 2006) http://edisweb.usitc.gov/
edismirror/337-565/Violation/268554/309920/10d7/81142f.pdf ("[Tihe economic prong .... [is a]
fairly low threshold.") (statement of Judge Luckern).
115. See, e.g., Initial Determination, Certain Network Controllers and Products Containing
Same, Investigation No. 337-TA-531, at 5-6 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Jul. 6, 2005), http://
edisweb.usitc.gov/edismirror/337-531/Violation/266918/305226/9e97f3881.pdf (including research,
development, design and engineering expenses, salary and fringe benefits, equipment costs, facility
investments-including square footage, leasing and renovation expenses as investments supporting
the economic prong of domestic industry).
116. Order No. 20: Denying Complainants' Motion No. 577-23 That Their Patent Licensing
Program Satisfies The Domestic Industry Requirement Of Section 337(a)(3)(C) at 3, Certain Wire-
less Communications Equipment, Articles Therein, and Products Containing the Same, Investigation
No. 337-TA-577 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Feb. 22, 2007), http://edisweb.usitc.gov/edismirror/337-
577/Violation/272990/315511/106/8486ce.pdf.
117. See, e.g., Determination on Motion for Temporary Relief, Certain Dynamic Sequential
Gradient Compression Devices and Component Parts Thereof, Investigation No. 337-TA-335, at 56-
58 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Nov. 1992), http://edisweb.usitc.gov/edismirror/337-335/Violation/
217027/236454/3bc/5F4E8 l.pdf (finding no violation of section 337 because the complainant did
not practice the patent and therefore did not satisfy the technical prong of domestic industry).
118. Section 337 requires that complainants establish acts of unfair import trade practices for
each respondent. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(l)(B) (2000) (providing that "importation into the United
States, the sale for importation, or the sale within the United States after importation" of infringing
articles constitutes an act of unfair trade).
119. Customs requirements for importation simplify proof. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, IMPORTING INTO THE UNITED STATES: A GUIDE FOR COMMERCIAL IMPORTERS (2006),
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/toolbox/publications/trade/iius.ctt/iius.pdf.
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respondents allege their actions do not fall within the statute. "° Still, because
each respondent's act of unfair trade must be established individually, it
cannot be a common issue and thus does not fit with the class form.
Infringement necessarily depends on the features of each accused prod-
uct and is a question of fact unique to each accused product. It is thus
unsuitable to the class form. Infringement may be either literal or equiva-
lent. Literal infringement occurs if each and every element of the asserted
claim, as construed, can be identified in the accused product. '2 Alterna-
tively, the accused product infringes under the doctrine of equivalents if
every claim element has a literal counterpart or equivalent in the accused
product. 22 Both literal infringement and infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents12 are questions of fact. 1 4 Because infringement requires direct
reference to each accused product, 2 class certification on the issue is im-
126proper.
120. See DuVALL ET AL., supra note 6, § 3.19.
121. E.g., Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Lit-
eral infringement requires that the accused device contain each limitation of the claim exactly; any
deviation from the claim precludes a finding of literal infringement." (citing Cole v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 532 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 812 (1997))).
122. See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem., 520 U.S. 17, 40-41 (1997). Equiva-
lence arises if a person of ordinary skill in the art would find equivalence between the claim
elements and the features of the accused product or process, see id. at 24-25 (quoting Graver Tank
& Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)), or if the allegedly infringing prod-
uct performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way in order to achieve the
substantially same result, Graver, 339 U.S. at 608 (1950) (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v.
Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
123. Equivalence is uniquely fact based, often requiring resolution by a jury. E.g., Winans v.
Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 344 (1853) ("It must be the same in kind, and effected by the employment
of his mode of operation in substance. Whether, in point of fact, the defendant's cars did copy the
plaintiff's invention, in the sense above explained, is a question for the jury .... ).
124. See, e.g., Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("[In infringement analysis] the claims as construed are applied to the accused device or method, a
question of fact."); Johnson Worldwide Assoc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 988 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("[T]he court first determines, as a matter of law, the correct claim scope, and then compares the
properly-construed claim to the accused device to determine, as a matter of fact, whether all of the
claim limitations are present, either literally or by a substantial equivalent, in the accused device.").
125. Infringement analysis is slightly simplified in patent-based section 337 investigations.
Willful infringement may give rise to escalated damages in federal district courts. 35 U.S.C. § 284
(2000); see generally In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1865 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 20, 2007).
However, the ITC can only provide injunctive relief, making willfulness irrelevant. See 19 U.S.C. §
1337 (d)-(k).
126. Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. V. Methode Elecs., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 720 (N.D.
III. 1968) (finding questions of infringement not to be "question[s] of law or fact common to the
class," and thus more properly adjudicated under separate trials under Rule 42); see also Wilson
Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[Tjhe legal
function of giving meaning to claim terms always takes place in the context of a specific accused
infringing device or process."). Indeed, one court certified a class of accused infringers on the issue
of infringement because "most of the named defendants have almost admitted infringement." Re-
search Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497, 499 (N.D. II1. 1969).
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C. Bifurcation Permits Common Issue Disposition with Distinct
Proceedings for Individual Issues
Despite the individualized nature of the elements of acts of unfair trade
and infringement, patent-based section 337 investigations could still be con-
ducted at least partially in the class form by using a bifurcated trial'2 7 with
class proceedings limited to common issues"' and separate proceedings for
individual issues." 9 Federal courts can bifurcate trials under appropriate cir-
cumstances. 30 Similarly, federal courts can certify classes on particular
issues under Rule 23(c)(4)(A).13' Thus, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
present an existing model for bifurcation, analyzing common issues in a
certified class and holding separate proceedings on the other, individual• . .132
elements of acts of unfair trade and infringement. Respondent class certi-
fication on common issues would help calibrate respondents' incentives in a
manner that lowers the cost of participation, spreads the cost of obtaining
judgments more equitably, and eliminates opportunities for opportunistic
default.
Motions to certify a respondent class provide a way for appearing respon-
dents to convince potential defaulters to contribute to the cost of common
defenses. Appearing respondents can move to certify a class at their own op-
tion. If successful, nonappearing respondents would avoid default judgments
and associated procedural penalties. Avoiding those penalties would certainly
be worth something to the nonappearing parties. Similarly, any contribution to
litigation expenses lowers the costs for appearing respondents. The motion
127. The ITC has a policy of rapid investigation resolution, which may make separate pro-
ceedings awkward. On the other hand, disposition of claim construction, defenses of invalidity and
unenforceability, and domestic industry analysis would resolve a substantial majority of the issues,
leaving only the rather technical step of applying the claims to accused products. Indeed, efficien-
cies may be gained because the AU could find a patent invalid or unenforceable or a lack of
domestic industry, thereby mooting the question of infringement.
128. Supra Section II.A.
129. Supra Section H.B. The order of presentation may be troubling. Complainants may be
reluctant to have a preliminary proceeding with common issues because presentation of invalidity
and unenforceability arguments at the beginning of the investigation would probably negatively
influence the presiding AL. Still, the only remaining issues following disposition of common issues
are acts of unfair trade and infringement. Neither of those issues calls for equitable discretion from
the ALI.
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) ("The court ... may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-
claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-
claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues .... ).
131. Id. R. 23(c)(4)(A) ("When appropriate ... an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues.....). For a detailed discussion of Rule 23(c)(4)(A)'s
role as a parallel to Rule 42(b), see Laura J. Hines, The Dangerous Allure of the Issue Class Action,
79 IND. L.J. 567, 587-88 (2004).
132. Hines, supra note 13 1, at 568-88; see, e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th
Cir. 1986) (finding no abuse of discretion for certification of a bifurcated class action, with common
issues of "state of the art" defense, product identification, defectiveness, defendant's negligence, and
punitive damages resolved with a certified class; and individual issues of causation, actual damages
and comparative fault tried on an individual basis).
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thus becomes a bargaining chip for appearing respondents when negotiating
with respondents considering default.
This procedural mechanism addresses at least two negative incentives.
First, appearing respondents benefit because contributions to the "common
defense" would lower their costs. These respondents are no longer paying
more than their share for judgments that, due to collateral estoppel or stare
decisis, benefit all respondents.
Moreover, defaulting and free riding on another's judgment becomes
less attractive as participation costs decrease. Facing a choice between de-
fault and virtually automatic exclusion or a reduced participation cost, some
respondents will opt for the latter. Even if a respondent defaults and avoids
the cost of appearance in the hope that it can benefit from another respon-
dent's judgment, it still faces harsh default penalties. It will likely be subject
to a temporary exclusion order until the investigation is terminated. That
could take years if the judgment is appealed. The prospect of joining a re-
spondent class at reduced cost and avoiding those interim penalties may
present an attractive alternative.
Finally, respondent class certification eliminates opportunities for initial
entry of appearance and subsequent default when it becomes clear that other
respondents will bear the cost of successfully presenting a defense of inva-
lidity or unenforceability with collateral estoppel effects. Simply put, once a
court certifies the class, the only relevant party is the representative. Mem-
bers of the class are locked into the class for disposition of class-certified
issues.
III. LARGE AND WIDELY DISPERSED RESPONDENT CLASSES SATISFY
THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
This Part argues that respondent classes in patent-based section 337 in-
vestigations can satisfy the thresholds for class certification under Rule
23(a) and the additional requirements under Rule 23(b). Section III.A ana-
lyzes respondent groups under Rule 23(a) and suggests that these groups
satisfy Rule 23(a) where joinder is impracticable due to extreme geographic
distribution of respondents and/or unworkably large numbers of respon-
dents. Section III.B examines these respondent groups under the provisions
of Rule 23(b) and argues that respondent class certification is proper under
Rule 23(b)(3), Rule 23(b)(1)(B), or Rule 23(b)(2).
A. Respondent Classes Can Satisfy the Requirements of Rule 23(a)
This Section argues that respondent classes in patent-based section 337
investigations can satisfy the four threshold requirements of Rule 23(a),
necessary precursors for class certification. 13 Courts permit defendant class
133. A party seeking class certification must satisfy all requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least
one of the conditions set forth in Rule 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b). For the analysis of respon-
dent class certification under Rule 23(b), see infra Section III.B.
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certification in patent cases where the class of accused infringers satisfies all
requirements of Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and ade-
quacy of representation.'34 First, this Section suggests that the numerosity
requirement addresses logistical difficulties associated with mass joinder
and notions of judicial economy rather than sheer numbers. Large and/or
widely dispersed respondent groups present practical difficulties consistent
with this requirement. This Section then argues that the remaining require-
ments will be generally satisfied due to the nature of common questions of
law and fact regarding accused infringers under substantive patent law and
section 337.
Federal courts require a logistically challenging number of class mem-
bers to justify class certification. 33 Numerosity does not follow a rigid
1361
formula. Some courts emphasize impracticality of joinder over strict ad-
herence to the number of parties. 137 Impracticality may arise from several
factors, including the number of class members, the logistical difficulty of
identifying class members, and the geographic distribution of class mem-
138 139bers.  For example, in Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R.C.L. Electronics, Inc., a
patentee brought suit against only thirteen defendants, yet the court certified
a defendant class.14° The patentee argued that thirteen defendants fell short
of generally accepted numerosity requirements. 4 ' The court held that be-
cause the defendants were widely dispersed in California, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New York, and North Carolina, "U]oinder [wa]s not only im-
practicable, but impossible."'
42
Similarly, class certification of ITC respondents can be appropriate de-
spite the fact that there will rarely be hundreds of respondents. Some
134. See, e.g., Standal's Patents Ltd. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., Civ. No. 86-219-FR, 1986 WL 582
(D. Or. Dec. 22, 1986); Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497, 498-99
(N.D. 111. 1969); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 719-21
(N.D. 111. 1968).
135. Rule 23(a)(1) requires that "the class [be] so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable." FEO. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
136. See, e.g., Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 220 (D. Ala. 1971) ("It appears that the
question of whether a number is so large as to make joinder impracticable is dependent not upon any
arbitrary limit, but rather upon the circumstances surrounding the case.").
137. For an example of a court's emphasis on impracticality over pure numbers, see Citizens
Banking Co. v. Monticello State Bank, 143 F.2d 261, 262-64 (8th Cir. 1944), in which the court
permitted a class constituting only twelve plaintiffs. Despite the fact that Citizens Banking preceded
the 1966 enactment of Rule 23, other courts have broadly supported its analysis. E.g., DeMarco v.
Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968) ("[A] determination of practicability should depend upon
all the circumstances surrounding a case.").
138. E.g., Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1993); Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott &
Co., 651 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1981).
139. 53 F.R.D. 531 (D.N.H. 1971).
140. Dale Elecs., Inc., 53 F.R.D. at 533-36.
141. Id. at 534.
142. Id.
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complainants name many respondents,4 4 and ITC investigations increas-
ingly involve large respondent pools.'44 Even though the sheer number of
named respondents may not be impressive, their geographic distribution can
be extreme. 45 Complainants are increasingly designating larger numbers of
origins of accused products. 46 Accordingly, practical difficulties associated
with bringing multiple foreign entities before the ITC may become signifi-
cant enough to accord with Rule 23(a)(1).
In addition to numerosity, respondents must share some common legal or
factual concerns that warrant class certification. "4' Generally, commonality
requires that all class members possess the same interest, suffer the same in-
jury, and share some question of law or fact. 48 As discussed in Section II.A.,
obvious common questions of law and fact are claim construction, defenses of
invalidity and unenforceability, 4 and domestic industry analysis.
Respondents will also advance typical arguments regarding claim con-
struction, defenses of invalidity and unenforceability, and domestic industry
analysis. 50 The representative parties' claims or defenses need not always
involve the same facts or law: claims or defenses are typical if a common
element of fact or law exists.'' Respondents differ little in these contexts.'
5 2
Thus there is no reason to expect a dramatically atypical argument from any
respondent in any of these areas.
143. E.g., Notice to the Parties, Certain Laminated Floor Panels, Investigation No. 337-TA-
545 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Oct. 13, 2005), http://edisweb.usitc.gov/edismirror/337-
5451Violation1240373/268096/12ef/6be097.pdf (naming thirty-two respondents).
144. See supra Section I.B.
145. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, supra note 34 (designating Belize,
China, India, Israel, Nicaragua, Syria, and the United Kingdom).
146. See supra Section I.B.2.
147. Rule 23(a)(2) requires that "there [be] questions of law or fact common to the class ......
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Note that Rule 23(a)(2) refers to "questions of law or fact": either form of
question is sufficient.
148. See, e.g., E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); see also In
re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1080 (6th Cir. 1996) ("The commonality test 'is qualitative
rather than quantitative, that is, there need be only a single issue common to all members of the
class."' (quoting 1 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3.10, at
3-50 (3d ed. 1992))); Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The fact that
there is some factual variation among the class grievances will not defeat a class action." (citing
Patterson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 631 F.2d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1980))).
149. See also Dale Elecs., Inc. v. R.C.L. Elecs., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 537 (D.N.H. 1971) ("The
issues raised relative to validity are those that are common to most patent cases, i.e.: (1) the validity
of each of the five patents; (2) enforceability of the patents under the doctrine of file wrapper estop-
pel; (3) enforceability of the patents under the doctrine of patent misuse; and (4) enforceability of
the patents.").
150. Rule 23(a)(3) requires that "the claims or defenses of the representative parties [be]
typical of the claims or defenses of the class... " FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
151. See Senter v. Gen. Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511,525 n.31 (6th Cir. 1976) (citing Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1968).
152. See supra Section II.A.
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Finally, respondents can satisfy the last requirement of Rule 23(a), ade-
quacy of representation.' Fair and adequate representation requires both
that the representative parties have common interests with the remainder of
the class and that the representative parties appear able to vigorously protect
the interests of the class. 5 4 Conflicts arise when the representative parties
are unwilling to represent the other members' interests, either because they
agree with the plaintiff or are not willing to serve as representatives.'5 5 Yet
courts tolerate a certain amount of conflict as long as these conflicts do not
"threaten the viability of class treatment itself."'
5 6
Any conflicts among respondents are probably not sufficient to threaten
the viability of the class. 5 7 Claim construction, the defenses of invalidity
and enforceability, and domestic industry analysis all entail facts independ-
ent of any respondent. All respondents are generally motivated to invalidate
or render unenforceable the patent asserted against them or to undermine the
complainant's alleged domestic industry. In a respondent-initiated respon-
dent class certification, the moving respondent is clearly motivated to serve
as a representative. Finally, a flexible opt-out rule, as in Rule 23(b)(3) and
discussed below, may accommodate respondents who wish to opt out of the
class and present their own arguments.
B. Respondent Classes Can Satisfy the Additional
Requirements of Rule 23(b)
A party seeking to certify a class must demonstrate that one of four al-
ternative grounds for justifying certification exists under Rule 23(b). That
party must show that (a) multiple dispositions could impose conflicting ob-
ligations on the party opposing the class,"' (b) absent class members'
interests may be harmed by an action involving only some members of the' 59
class, (c) the party opposing the class has either acted or refused to act in amanner generally applicable to the class,' 6° or (d) common questions of law
153. Rule 23(a)(4) requires that "the representative parties ... fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
154. See Senter, 532 F.2d at 524-25.
155. 6 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 19:4 (4th ed.
2002).
156. Id. (quoting In re Arthur Treacher's Franchise Litig., 93 FR.D. 590, 598 (E.D. Pa. 1982)),
157. See Webcraft Techs., Inc. v. Alden Press, Inc., 228 U.S.P.Q. 182, 185 (N.D. Il. 1985)
("Litigation of issues of validity and enforceability will focus on prior art references and [the pat-
entee's] conduct rather than on the nature of the defendants' products, where protection of trade
secrets might become a troublesome problem and the defendants [sic] interests are most likely to
become divergent or antagonistic."); see also Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc.,
301 F. Supp. 497, 499 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (certifying defendant class where industrial members main-
tained communication with each other as to common issues and maintained common defense fund).
158. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(l)(A).
159. Id. R. 23(b)(1)(B).
160. Id. R. 23(b)(2).
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or fact predominate individual issues, and the class form is preferable to
alternative procedural methods. 
6
1
This Section argues that at least three grounds exist under Rule 23(b) to
certify respondent classes. The most appropriate provision is Rule 23(b)(3)
because common questions predominate over individual issues and because
the class form may be preferable to current alternative procedural mecha-
nisms. Additional grounds for respondent class certification may be found
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) because the collateral estoppel and stare decisis ef-
fects of judgments regarding claim construction, the defenses of invalidity
and unenforceability, and domestic industry analysis implicate the interests
of absent or defaulting parties. Finally, respondent classes could be certified
under Rule 23(b)(2) because the complainant, by asserting that its patent is
valid and enforceable and that it has a domestic industry, has arguably acted
in a manner generally applicable to all respondents.
1. Respondent Classes Are Most Properly
Certified under Rule 23(b)(3)
The strongest basis for respondent class certification is under Rule
23(b)(3), the last provision of Rule 23(b). Rule 23(b)(3) requires predomi-
nance of common legal or factual issues and practical preference for the
class form. First, where a respondent class is limited to claim construction,
defenses of invalidity or unenforceability, and domestic industry analysis,"'
"questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members ....
Although the ability to opt out of Rule 23(b)(3) defendant classes has
essentially made defendant class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) irrelevant
in domestic patent litigation, incentives shift significantly in section 337
proceedings such that respondent class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is
arguably preferable over procedural alternatives. 6 Given the increasing rate
of default among respondents, respondent class certification seems attractive
as an alternative to mass joinder.166 Respondent class certification providesdifferent incentives that may encourage at least minimal participation by all
161. Id. R. 23(b)(3).
162. See supra Part II.
163. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The Technograph court found that questions of validity were
"predominant over any questions affecting only individual members of the class ...." Technograph
Printed Circuits, Ltd. V. Methode Elecs., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 724 (N.D. 111. 1968).
164. 8 CHISUM, supra note 55, § 21.03[71 ("As an excluded member [from the class], the
persons enjoys [sic] a 'tails you lose-heads I don't lose' situation under the Blonder-Tongue doc-
trine."); see also Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 164 U.S.P.Q. 552, 553 (D. Md. 1970)
(stating that there is "little or nothing [to] be gained" by defendant class certification under Rule
23(b)(3)).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 9-12.
166. The current Rules of Practice and Procedure for the ITC permit joinder. 19 C.F.R.
§ 207.112 (2007). That form could be seen as impracticable (or arguably inferior to class certifica-
tion) because respondent default rates are high and appear to be increasing. See supra Section I.B.
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respondents. 6 Accordingly, the class form may be "superior to other avail-
able methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.'
68
Additional factors in the second sentence of Rule 23(b)(3) lend support
to respondent class certification:
[M]atters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the contro-
versy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action. 169
All of these factors either support respondent class certification or are inap-
plicable to patent-based section 337 investigations. First, respondents may
want to take control of their own defenses. Their major individual interests
revolve around the elements of acts of unfair trade and infringement, but as
discussed above, these elements would necessarily be severed from the other
proceedings in the proposed bifurcation. In addition, a flexible opt-out
rule, like Rule 23(b)(3), permits respondents to opt out of the class and ad-
vance their own arguments as a party alongside the class. Second, even
though there may be separate infringement actions pending in federal dis-
trict courts, a class investigation could continue because ITC determinations
are not binding on federal district courts."' Third, the single-forum ITC ju-
risdiction concentrates the litigation "in the particular forum.""1
72
Complainants already concentrate their claims of unfair import trade prac-
tices in the ITC, a practice that vitiates any argument that concentrating
litigation would be undesirable. Finally, while the nature of patent law
makes class actions difficult, it would not make them impossible.
73
167. See supra Section I.C.
168. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
169. Id. R. 23(b)(3).
170. See supra Section II.C.
171. Even if the Federal Circuit issues a final opinion on appeal of an ITC investigation, it
does not have res judicata effect on subsequent courts. Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
831 F.2d 1017, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 196 (1974)); see also Tex.
Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1996). This
principle includes invalidity judgments. In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litig., 721 F.
Supp. 596, 603-04 (D. Del. 1989) (finding that ITC issues and federal court issues are different, and
Blonder-Tongue does not include administrative agency findings). The ITC's findings, however, may
be persuasive precedent. Tex. Instruments, 90 F.3d at 1569. Conversely, prior federal district court
decisions have res judicata effect on the ITC. Young Eng'rs, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 721
F.2d 1305, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
172. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3,C).
173. See supra Section I.C (suggesting bifurcation of trial, certification of a class for com-
mon issues of claim construction, validity, and enforceability issues, and separate individualized
infringement and acts of unfair trade proceedings).
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2. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) Also Justifies Respondent Class Certification
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) also provides a basis under which to certify a respon-
dent class. That provision permits class certification to avoid an environment
where absent parties are unable to protect their interests necessarily impli-
cated by multiple adjudications. 7 4 In a patent infringement context, prior
adjudications may create an informal stare decisis effect-that is, a subse-
quent district court will give substantial weight to a prior district court's
decisions on claim construction, the defenses of invalidity and unenforce-
ability, or the element of infringement.'
At least one court has rejected the contention that one court's precedent
alone justifies class certification in an intellectual property dispute. In Tilley
v. TJX, 76 the plaintiff asserted copyright claims against several defendants.
The district court certified the defendant class to avoid "a risk that a finding
against TJX ... could, through stare decisis, result in the substantial im-
pairment of subsequent defendants' efforts to defend cases against Tilley."'
77
The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "the anticipated
effect of stare decisis on subsequent cases brought by absent class members,
without more, is an insufficient justification for class certification under
Rule 23(b)(l)(B)."' 78 Because class members must share common circum-
stances under Rule 23(a), the district court's stare decisis argument could
automatically justify any cause of action to be conducted as a class action.7 9
It noted, however, that "it is conceivable that stare decisis, in combination
with other factors, might support a finding that a substantial impairment or
impediment looms. ' 'I 8° Yet "[b]ecause the district court did not identify any
other factor counseling in favor of a finding of substantial impairment or
174. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) permits class certification where "the prosecution of separate actions
... would create a risk of... adjudications ... which would as a practical matter be dispositive of
the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede
their ability to protect their interests." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(l)(B).
175. Tilley v. TJX Cos., 345 F.3d 34, 41 (lst Cir. 2003) ("[Tjhe quandary concerns whether
the mere possibility that the precedential effect of an individual suit will influence the outcome of
later actions .... "); Dale Elecs., Inc. v. R.C.L. Elecs., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 537 (D.N.H. 1971);
Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd., v. Methode Elecs., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 723 (N.D. I11. 1968)
("Selected adjudications of the question[] of invalidity ... may be accorded great weight in indus-
trial relations by comity between courts and may greatly impair and impede the ability of members
of the class ... who are not parties to this action to protect their interests."); see also Gillette Co. v.
S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 919 F.2d 720, 723 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("The fact that the validity of those
claims has previously been upheld in an earlier litigation is ... to be given weight, though not stare
decisis effect.").
176. 345 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2003).
177. Tilley, 345 F.3d at 41 (quoting Tilley v. TJX Cos., 212 F.R.D. 43,48 (D. Mass. 2003)).
178. Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
179. See id. at 41-42.
180. Id. at 42-43 ("While precedent alone will not usually permit certification under Rule
23(b)(l)(B), precedent plus some other practical factor, such as marketplace sensitivity to the result
of an individual suit for a declaration of patent validity or patent infringement, should be sufficient
to qualify for a Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class." (quoting 2 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 148, § 4:10)).
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impediment," the First Circuit vacated the district court's certification of the
defendant class.'8'
A prior court's determinations of validity and even claim construction,
even if not strictly stare decisis, may constitute the "super precedent" that
concerned the Tilley court when it considered class certification under Rule
23(b)(1)(B). 112 Validity judgments and claim constructions require substan-
tial judicial efforts to understand the underlying technology, interpret the
terms of the patent, and ascertain the patent's validity. 83 Future courts will
no doubt be reluctant to set aside previous courts' substantial efforts.
The precedential effect of these rulings in the ITC is even more pro-
nounced than it would be among intra- or interjurisdictional sister federal
district courts. The ITC, as a single forum, would be bound by its own
precedent in subsequent investigations "4 in a manner meaningfully different
from that in which sister federal district courts are bound by stare decisis
principles. 8 ' Accordingly, defaulting parties or parties not named in the
complaint are at a disadvantage in terms of their ability to defend their inter-
ests in a given investigation, justifying class certification under this
provision of Rule 23(b).
3. Rule 23(b)(2) Also Justifies Respondent Class Certification
Rule 23(b)(2) provides alternative grounds for respondent class certifica-
tion. That provision allows class certification where parties seek injunctive
181. 1ilev, 345 E3d at 43.
182. E.g., Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., 285 F Supp. 714, 723 (N.D.
I11. 1968) ("Selected adjudications of... invalidity ... may be accorded great weight ... between
courts and may greatly impair and impede the ability of members of the class and any sub-classes
thereof who are not parties to this action to protect their interests."); cf Dale Elecs., Inc. v. R.C.L.
Elecs., Inc., 53 ER.D. 531, 537 (D.N.H. 1971) (stating that courts will give a prior ruling only
"some weight," but nevertheless certifying under (b)(1) because "[a] final determination at one time
and one place of either validity or invalidity will eliminate once and for all any uncertainty as to the
status of these patents.").
183. See Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F Supp. 497, 500 (N.D. I11.
1969) ("The difficulty of subject matter inherent in most patent cases ... gives selected adjudica-
tions of .. . invalidity more than the usual weight when a court is considering the adoption of
another court's opinion or reasoning by means of comity.").
184. The ITC would be hard pressed, when faced with its own precedent in a subsequent
investigation, to come to a different conclusion as to claim construction, defenses of invalidity and
unenforceability, or domestic industry analysis. None of the operative facts underlying its previous
rulings on the patent issues could change; only the respondents' identities and their accused products
would differ among investigations. Additionally, none of the other factors courts consider in deter-
mining the role of stare decisis-impracticability of the previous ruling, reliance and equitable
concerns, or later developments in the law-are relevant. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992).
185. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996) ("[T]reating [claim]
interpretive issues as purely legal will promote (though it will not guarantee) intrajurisdictional
certainty through the application of stare decisis on those questions not yet subject to interjurisdic-
tional uniformity under the authority of the single appeals court.").
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or declaratory relief. 16 Generally, only injunctive relief is available under
Rule 23(b)(2).' s7 Courts that have certified accused infringer classes under
Rule 23(b)(2) have generally justified certification because "[b]y notifying
alleged infringers of the patent, threatening suits for infringement if licenses
are not taken, and by bringing these civil actions against them, the plaintiff
has acted on grounds generally applicable to the class."' 8
Rule 23(b)(2) does not typically apply to defendant classes, 89 but an ex-
ception to this rule exists in "strange cases" where the relief sought is in the
form of a "reverse declaratory action."' g Respondents asserting defenses of
patent invalidity or unenforceability present such "strange cases." In fact,
declaratory relief claims'9' and counterclaims of invalidity, unenforceability
and/or noninfringementare standard practice, making accused infringer
classes uniquely suited to Rule 23(b)(2).
4. Rule 23(b)(1)(A) Does Not Support Respondent Class Certification
Finally, Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is the only provision of Rule 23(b) that cannot
justify respondent class certification. Rule 23(b)(1)(A) seeks to avoid a
situation where multiple judgments impose mutually inconsistent legal obli-
gations on a party. 92 The major obligations arising from an infringement
action are infringement liability for the accused infringer or invalidity and/or
unenforceability for the patentee. None present the risk of inconsistent legal
186. Rule 23(b)(2) requires that "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corre-
sponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
187. Patentees are entitled to seek either an injunction, 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000), and/or dam-
ages, id. § 284, for patent infringement. Of course, the ITC is authorized to provide only final
injunctive relief in the form of cease and desist orders, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f) (2000), or exclusion
orders, id. § 1337(d)(1), (g)(l) and (g)(2).
188. Research Corp., 301 F. Supp. at 500 (citing Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Meth-
ode Elecs., Inc., 285 F Supp. 714, 723 (N.D. II1. 1968)).
189. For an explanation, see illey v.TJX Cos., 345 F3d 34 (1 st Cir. 2003):
In cases involving garden-variety defendant classes, there will be no single act or refusal to act
on the part of the plaintiff ... that makes injunctive or declaratory relief appropriate. Rather, it
will be the defendants ... who allegedly have acted in the same tortious or unlawful way
(here, by selling ... articles [that infringe plaintiff's copyright]).
Id. at 39.
190. Id. at 39 n.3 ("We say [that defendant classes under Rule 23(b)(2) are improper] 'in
general' because one can envision strange cases in which a defendant class might fit within the
literal contours of Rule 23(b)(2)." (citing Henson v. E. Lincoln Twp., 814 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir.
1987))). Henson mentions the possibility of a "reverse declaratory action" but unfortunately goes
little farther than that description in its analysis. Presumably such a situation arises where the defen-
dant seeks equitable relief against a plaintiff in response to the plaintiff's allegations.
191. Potential patent infringement defendants "need not await the filing of a threatened suit by
the patentee; the validity of the patent may be tested under the Declaratory Judgment Act." Walker
Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176 (1965); see also Kerotest
Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180,185-86 (1952),
192. Rule 23(b)(l)(A) permits class certification where "the prosecution of separate actions
... would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications ... which would establish incom-
patible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
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obligations. As discussed above, each accused product must be examined
individually: a product either infringes or it does not. Finally, the collateral
estoppel effects of invalidity and unenforceability ensure that the patentee
will not be subject to inconsistent legal obligations.
CONCLUSION
The ITC provides patentees with effective remedies against infringing
importers. As Section I.B empirically demonstrates, many section 337 re-
spondents default, making appearing respondents bear disproportional costs.
Respondent-initiated respondent classes address this problem. Substantive
patent law and section 337 require bifurcation, with common issues of claim
construction, defenses of invalidity or enforceability, and domestic industry
analysis separated from consideration of the individualized elements of acts
of unfair trade and infringement. Bifurcated proceedings allow efficient dis-
position of common issues while permitting separate proceedings on
unavoidably individualized issues. In certifying a respondent class that
meets the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b), the ITC could provide
procedural means to lower participation costs and eliminate opportunities
for opportunistic default.
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